

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA 39230
TO INFO	Chief, IO (Attn: <input type="checkbox"/> EE, COS/G		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-124-39/3
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich <i>Am Se</i>		DATE 16 December 1958
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/QKACTIVE/Operations Report of Meeting with <input type="checkbox"/>		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED.....		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MARKED FOR INDEXING
See paragraph B (5)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
REFERENCE(S)		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007	
<p>A. <u>CHEISHVILI Case</u></p> <p>1. On 13 December <input type="checkbox"/> met with <input type="checkbox"/> in a meeting of rather unusual importance. The significance of the discussions suggest that this special report be written for Headquarters information and possible action as will be pointed out, particularly in paragraph B-5 below. The immediate cause of this particular get-together was the CHEISHVILI case. For the past two weeks or more, considerable pressure has been mounting at TPLINGO to effect contact with this much publicized Georgian defector. This pressure became particularly strong as it was exerted by his staff upon <input type="checkbox"/> in turn made repeated requests to <input type="checkbox"/> urging them to bring about some action through their normal channel which would enable TPLINGO to gain access to CHEISHVILI.</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> became especially concerned when it appeared that at the outset of his career as Security Officer at TPFEEELING his apparent ineffectiveness in satisfying the wishes of the TPLINGO staff in this case might be interpreted by them as an indication of how he would handle other matters coming within his competence during his tour of duty. Since it was clear from a record of the CHEISHVILI case itself that nothing <input type="checkbox"/> could do could possibly bring about the kind of result TPLINGO desired, it was suggested that this meeting be held with <input type="checkbox"/> so that the full story of the developments in the CHEISHVILI case could be outlined for him.</p> <p>3. A resume of all the traffic in the case in Munich Base files from 23 November to 12 December was prepared prior to the meeting, and <input type="checkbox"/> was thus enabled to see for himself the insurmountable problems involved in arranging for TPLINGO to gain access to CHEISHVILI. From the record it became clear that only upon receipt of FRAN 1169 of 9 December and DIR 03893 of 10 December did it become possible to give a green light to TPLINGO enabling them to proceed with arrangements to contact the Georgian author. This green light had actually been flashed prior to our meeting of 13 December, and TPLINGO had effected contact with John Riley of AFRF, so that tentative arrangements had already been made for TPLINGO to get in touch with CHEISHVILI provided the latter agreed.</p> <p>4. As a result of being given the opportunity to review carefully and completely the whole record of the traffic in the CHEISHVILI case, <input type="checkbox"/> was fully satisfied that everything possible had been done both by <input type="checkbox"/> on the one hand and Munich Base on the other to give full consideration to the interests of TPLINGO. <input type="checkbox"/> decided that his best course of action at this time was to continue to pursue the matter with Riley and he planned to send <input type="checkbox"/> and Identity A to Frankfurt on Monday, 15 December. This plan was subject to modification pending a possible telephone call from <input type="checkbox"/> who would check on the CHEISHVILI matter on 15 December in Frankfurt when they were due to meet with KUBARK representatives on the matter of evacuation.</p> <p>B. <u>EVACUATION</u></p> <p>1. Another matter about which personnel at TPLINGO have long been concerned has been that of evacuation. <input type="checkbox"/> particularly has been keenly aware of the need for readiness in this respect and he has repeatedly sought to obtain from <input type="checkbox"/> full details of any plans which may exist for the removal of TPLINGO employees and assets in the event of a crisis. Unfortunately, as Headquarters is aware, this is another problem whose solution has been extremely slow in</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>200-124-39/3</i></p>			
FORM 10-57 <b>53</b> (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED
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<p>developing, and [ ] has not been in a position to give [ ] the satisfaction that he desired. [ ], as he feared in the CHEISHVILI case, was also concerned lest it appear that he was dragging his feet on the evacuation plan. So it was agreed that this subject would also be discussed in the meeting with [ ]. By abstracting a few references from our files it was possible to demonstrate to [ ] that neither [ ] was responsible for the dearth of information on this whole subject.</p>		
<p>2. It so happened that early in December a Frankfurt meeting had been arranged at which competent KUBARK representatives, including Identity B of the USAREUR G-3 staff in Heidelberg, were present. This meeting scheduled for 15 December contemplated a full-scale review of the current status of evacuation plans at both TPLINGO and TPFEELING. It was at this session that [ ] draft plan for TPFEELING was to be gone over, the kinks removed, and a reasonably complete and workable set of ground rules established. [ ] plan for TPFEELING was the one referred to in EGMW 6986 of 24 November when Headquarters requested that a brief status report of any similar plan by PBCHORD should be forwarded. It was expected that as a result of the Frankfurt meeting both TPFEELING and PBCHORD could present to Headquarters an up-to-date report on the whole evacuation problem.</p>		
<p>3. After a thorough discussion of what had or had not been accomplished thus far, and after reviewing the complexities of coordination with ODIBEX, ODACID, KUBARK and the Projects all involved, [ ] indicated that he realized that the lack of information on evacuation and war plans could not be ascribed to negligence on the part of the TPLINGO Security Office, but he felt strongly, nevertheless, that somewhere along the line responsibility must be fixed for immediate action to be taken to assure that some reasonably effective plan for removing TPLINGO personnel and assets in the event of an emergency would not only be clearly established but would also be made known in detail, at least to responsible officials at TPLINGO, so that effective action could be taken if and when the need arose. Upon being assured by [ ] that the host of questions that have been plaguing them had all been prepared to present at the 15 December meeting, [ ] as obviously reassured that everything was being done at this time to bring this whole problem to a satisfactory conclusion.</p>		
<p>4. Having disposed of the subject of evacuation in a dire emergency, [ ] raised another problem which we feel is particularly worthy of reporting to Headquarters at this time in order to make it possible for them to give some thought to it before it is brought to their attention more formally through the PBAFFIRM channel.</p>		
<p>5. [ ] wanted to know about the disposition and utilization of TPLINGO personnel and assets in the event of a political development in West Germany which would make the removal of TPLINGO a necessity. He cited for example the contingency of a possible political compromise in the Berlin situation which might call for the removal from West Germany of such thorns in the Soviet and Satellite side as TPLINGO and TPFEELING. He also pointed out that a change in West German leadership involving the accession to power of a new political party might bring about the ouster of PBCHORD from this country. After discussing this subject in some detail, it was agreed that [ ] should bring the matter to [ ] attention and offer to prepare a paper for the attention of [ ] who in turn would undoubtedly refer the matter to Headquarters. Headquarters may therefore expect that this subject will soon be brought to their attention and while a great deal of thought has undoubtedly been given to the matter, it is hoped that this advance word may give them a bit more of an opportunity to be prepared with as satisfactory a reply as may be possible.</p>		
<p>C. <u>5-Y</u></p>		
<p>1. A short discussion was also held at this meeting on the subject of 5-Y, with particular attention to DIR 49252, MUNI 0938 and DIR 04069. Although</p>		
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<p>- 3 -</p> <p>5-Y obviously lends itself to a much more detailed conversation, lack of time made it necessary to confine ourselves to preparing the information required to reply to DIR 04069. The answer was subsequently sent with MUNI 1598.</p> <p>[ ]</p> <p>Approved: [ ]</p> <p>Attachment: Identity Sheet (USC)</p> <p>Distribution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ 2 - IO w/Iden Sheet in dupl (USC)</li><li>1 - EE w/1 cy Iden Sheet (USC)</li><li>2 - COS/G w/1 cy Iden Sheet (USC)</li></ul> <p>16 Dec 58</p> <p>200-124-39/3</p>				
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**SECRET**

**IDENTITY SHEET**

**IDENTITIES:**

- A. Rayden ARSENIDZE
- B. Lt. Col. KNAPP

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